Testing the expectations hypothesis: some new evidence for Japan by Daniel L. Thornton
this paper investigates the EH by estimating a
bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) for the long-
term and short-term interest rates and testing the
restrictions implied by the EH. This test was first
suggested by Campbell and Shiller (1987); however,
the procedure used here was developed by Bekaert
and Hodrick (2001).1
Second, this paper deals directly with the issue
of stationarity. While stationarity is frequently con-
sidered in testing the EH, its implications for the EH
are seldom discussed. This paper attempts to fill this
void. As a matter of theory, many economists and
financial specialists appear to believe that interest
rates are stationary. If they are not, the role played
by the EH in monetary policy may be diminished.
As a practical matter, interest rates tend to
exhibit considerable persistence. Indeed, the null
hypothesis of nonstationarity is frequently not
rejected even in relatively large, finite samples. This
is particularly important for Japanese interest rates
because they exhibit considerable persistence at
the monthly frequency. It is well known, however,
that tests of unit roots may have low power. More-
over, many financial market economists argue that
interest rates are stationary on theoretical grounds.
Given the differences of opinion about whether
interest rates are stationary in general, the VAR test
is applied under the assumption that interest rates
are either stationary or nonstationary. The issue of
stationarity is important only if the conclusions
concerning the EH differ markedly depending on
the assumption made.
1 Several of the tests of the EH that are frequently used have low power
and, more importantly, tend to generate results that can give a mislead-
ing impression of the strength or weakness of the EH. For a more
detailed discussion of this problem, see Thornton (2002 and 2003a)
and Kool and Thornton (2003).
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pending decisions, especially investment
decisions, are largely determined by long-
term interest rates, while the actions of the
monetary authority have a direct effect on interest
rates only at the very short end of the yield curve.
An important question in monetary economics and
finance is, How do the actions of the monetary
authority get translated along the entire yield curve?
In countries where a wide variety of bonds with
different maturities are traded, policy actions are
thought to be translated from the short end to the
long end of the term structure in accordance with
the expectations hypothesis (EH), which asserts
that the long-term rate is equal to market partici-
pants’ expectation of the short-term rate over the
holding period of the long-term asset plus a con-
stant risk premium.
Until the mid-1980s, the Japanese bond market
was relatively small, illiquid, and tightly regulated.
Japan’s capital markets were segmented by govern-
ment regulations, not the public’s preferences.
Arbitrage opportunities across maturities were
limited. Few thought that the EH applied to Japan.
Consequently, there was no reason to test the EH for
Japan. Monetary policy was thought to affect lend-
ing through quantity constraints and not through
interest rates.
The Japanese began to deregulate their bond
market in the 1970s. The structural changes in the
Japanese financial markets have generated consider-
able interest in testing the EH using Japanese data
(e.g., Campbell and Hamao, 1993; Singleton, 1990;
Shirakawa, 1987; and Shikano, 1985). This paper is
an extension of this research agenda, but differs
from the previous literature in two respects. First,
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Japanese short-term interest rates, which began
a rapid descent in late 1990, have hovered about
their theoretical zero bound since mid- to late 1998.
This feature of Japanese interest rates makes testing
the EH after 1998 particularly difficult.
Section II discusses the evolution of Japanese
financial markets during the postwar period and
reviews the literature on tests of the EH in Japan in
the postwar period. The data and some initial data
analysis are presented in Section III. Section IV
discusses nonstationarity and its implications for
the EH. Some preliminary tests of the EH, which arise
from the discussion in Section IV, are presented in
Section V. In Section VI, the VAR test is applied to
Japanese data under both assumptions—that interest
rates are stationary or nonstationary, but cointe-
grated. The results of these tests are presented and
discussed. The implications for rejecting the EH are
presented in Section VII, and the conclusions are
presented in Section VIII.
II. JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS
AND THE EH
A. Evolution of Japanese Financial
Markets
The Japanese financial markets were highly
regulated during the early postwar period. There
was virtually no issuance of government debt during
the first 15 years of the postwar period. Hence, there
was little need for a government debt market. When,
in the mid-1960s, the government needed to borrow
to finance infrastructure, regulations were introduced
that significantly limited the development of a sec-
ondary market in government debt. Specifically,
banks were not permitted to resell government debt
in the secondary market. Instead, there was an
implicit guarantee that the Bank of Japan would
purchase the government debt after a holding period
of 1 year. In addition, securities companies were
under administrative guidelines to maintain yields
in the secondary market as close as possible to
primary market yields. These restrictions signifi-
cantly impeded the development of a secondary
government debt market.2
Japanese corporations relied heavily on internal
funds and loans from private financial institutions
to finance investment. Equity and debt accounted
for less than 5 percent of industrial funds prior to
1975 (Hodder, 1991).
The effect of the oil-price shock in the early
1970s facilitated the development of the gensaki
market (the market for bond repurchase agreements)
and the secondary market in government debt. A
decrease in corporate investment following the oil-
price shock led to an improvement in short-term
corporate cash flows. This facilitated the expansion
of the gensaki market, as firms sought alternatives
to regulated bank deposits. The development of the
gensaki market was enhanced further when the
government formally recognized it and instituted
prudential guidelines in 1976 (Takagi, 1988).
At the same time, deficit spending increased.
The increased holding of government debt by banks
prompted the Bank of Japan to suspend its commit-
ment to repurchase government debt held for 1 year,
which resulted in an erosion of bank liquidity. To
shore up bank liquidity and to avoid debt monetiza-
tion by the Bank of Japan, in April 1977 banks were
permitted to sell government securities in the sec-
ondary market after a 1-year holding period. In
addition, the requirement that secondary yields
remain as close as possible to primary yields was
lifted. Restrictions on banks’ participation in the
secondary market were eased further over time and
eliminated in June 1985.
Simultaneous with these developments, the
Japanese made a number of successive regulatory
changes to liberalize cross-border capital flows.
These and other steps toward financial deregulation
resulted in deeper and more liquid financial markets,
reduced transactions costs, and increased the sub-
stitution between assets with different characteristics
and between assets with similar characteristics but
different maturities (e.g., Singleton, 1990; Leung,
Sanders, and Unal, 1991; and Takagi, 1988).
B. The EH in Japan
In financial markets where there is little possibil-
ity for arbitrage between assets with similar charac-
teristics but of different maturities, there is little
reason to think that the EH will hold. It is not sur-
prising, then, that there was virtually no statistical
testing of the EH using Japanese data prior to the
mid-1980s. Financial market deregulation changed
this. Since the 1980s, a number of researchers have
tested the EH in Japan, where, as elsewhere, it is
generally rejected.
Contrary to expectations, evidence supporting
the EH appears to be strongest during periods when
regulatory constraints effectively segmented long-
term and short-term financial markets and weakest
2 For additional details on these restrictions, see Takagi (1988).
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when deregulation provided greater arbitrage oppor-
tunities. Shikano (1985) analyzes data from April
1977 to June 1984. He finds that the EH was not
rejected for the entire period, but was rejected for
the period October 1981 to June 1984. Similarly,
Campbell and Hamao (1993) test the EH for the
periods November 1980 through July 1985 and
August 1985 through August 1990. While the EH is
rejected for both periods, the qualitative evidence
against the EH is stronger during the latter period.
Similarly, Shirakawa (1987) finds that the EH fares
worse for the period April 1981 through June 1986
compared with the period April 1977 through June
1986.
III. JAPANESE INTEREST RATES
A. Data
The data are end-of-month observations for
the period March 1981 to January 2003. The rates
include the 3-month gensaki rate and rates on
Japanese government bonds (JGBs) with maturities
of 0 to 1 year, 1 to 2 years, 2 to 3 years, up to 9 to
10 years. These data appear to be similar to those
used by Campbell and Hamao (1993), which covered
the period November 1980 to August 1990. Following
Campbell and Hamao’s taxonomy, the Treasury rates
are designated as 6-, 18-, 30-, 42-, 60-, 78-, 90-, 102-,
and 114-month rates, respectively. The gensaki rate
was obtained from the Japan Securities Dealers
Association, and the Treasury rates were obtained
from the Bloomberg database. In cases where
Treasury rates were missing, the Bloomberg data
were supplemented with data compiled by the Bond
Market Underwriter’s Association.3
Figure 1 shows the 3-month gensaki rate and
114-month JGB yield over the March 1981–January
2003 period. Japanese rates declined generally until
the late 1980s, rose until early 1990, and have since
generally declined. Since the early 1990s, the gensaki
3 I would like to thank Kiyoshi Watanabe for compiling these data.
There was one missing observation for the 6-month rate that occurred
on July 1992. The July observation was interpolated from the June
and August 6-month rates.
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rate has fallen much more rapidly than long-term
rates. This is especially true during the first half of
the 1990s, when the spread between the 114-month
and 3-month rates increased dramatically. Moreover,
since January 1992 the spread between the 114-
month and 3-month rates has averaged nearly 175
basis points compared with about 60 basis points
for the period up to January 1992.
B. The EH and the Zero Bound
The deterioration in the Japanese economy’s
performance in the early 1990s and the more recent
deflation have greatly affected interest rates. Because
of deflation, the gensaki rate has been at or near the
zero nominal interest rate bound since late 1998.
The zero bound has implications for testing the EH.
Because market participants may still form expecta-
tions of the future behavior of the short-term interest
rate (e.g., Okina and Shiratsuka, 2003), a zero interest
rate policy may impact longer-term rates through
the EH. What matters for the effectiveness of the EH
is what Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002) call the “policy
duration effect”—i.e., how long the market antici-
pates that the monetary authority will maintain the
current target rate—not whether monetary policy
actions are anticipated (e.g., Thornton, 2003b). It is
nevertheless the case that, when the short-term rate
is at the zero bound, the spread between the long-
term and short-term rate need not provide informa-
tion about the direction of changes in the short-term
real rate.
C. Persistence of Japanese Interest Rates
Like U.S. interest rates, Japanese interest rates
exhibit considerable persistence. The results of
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Dickey and Fuller,
1979) are reported in Table 1. Because the qualita-
tive conclusions were sensitive to the choice of lag
length, the lag lengths were chosen by the Schwarz
criterion and are denoted in parentheses below the
Dickey-Fuller test statistic. The results indicate that
the null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected even
at the 10 percent significance level for any of the
rates. 
The conclusions are robust over the sample
period. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows
the results from applying the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test to a rolling sample of 78 monthly obser-
vations for the 3-, 66-, and 114-month rates. The
results for the other Treasury rates are similar to
those shown in Figure 2. In general, the degree of
persistence increases with the maturity of the rate.
Except for some relatively short periods, and prima-
rily for the gensaki and other shorter-term rates,
the null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected. It
is well known that the augmented Dickey-Fuller
test is sensitive to shifts or breaks in the time-series
process. Hence, the conclusion that rates have a unit
root is not too surprising given the marked decline
in the level of rates in mid-1996. However, the unit
root hypothesis is also not rejected for any of the
rates for the seemingly more stable period from
March 1981 to October 1990.
D. Volume of Trade
It is important to note that, like the U.S. market
for Treasury securities, trading in Japanese Treasury
securities is focused on maturities at or near that
of the benchmark issue. When the trading volume
on a particular issue of Treasury debt with approxi-
mately 10 years of term remaining becomes large
enough, it might be designated by the market to be
the “benchmark” issue. An issue remains the bench-
mark issue until another issue receives this desig-
nation. There have been a number of benchmark
issues since August 1983. Higo (2000) reports that
the average maturity of an issue when it was first
designated the benchmark issue is just under 10
years. Trading volume in the Japanese Treasury
market tends to be focused on the benchmark issue,
maturities close to that of the benchmark issue, and,
to a much lesser extent, previous benchmark issues
regardless of their remaining maturity (Higo, 2000).
The market for other issues is relatively thin.
If the markets are thin, there may be day-to-day
or month-to-month variation in the rate that is due
solely to random variation owing to the thinness of
the market. One way to investigate whether the
thinness of the markets for shorter-maturity assets
might impact our results is to determine whether
the variance of the rates declines as the maturity
approaches that of the benchmark issue. This is
done here by calculating the ratio of the variance
of the rate at each maturity to the variance of the
3-month rate. If the thinness of the market is an
important factor, one might expect to see a marked
drop in the variance ratio as the maturity approaches
10 years.
Because of uncertainty as to whether interest
rates are stationary or unit root processes, the vari-
ance ratios are calculated for the levels and first
differences of the rates. The variance ratios for levels
and first differences are shown in Figures 3 and 4,
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respectively, for selected periods. Figure 3 suggests
the possibility of a thin-market effect for the period
March 1981–October 1990, when the variance ratio
increases to a maturity of 78 months and then
declines markedly. The variance ratios for the entire
period and for the period since October 1990 provide
no indication of a thin-market effect. The decline
of the variance ratios is nearly monotonic, as one
would expect if there were an important risk pre-
mium. The curve for the entire sample lies above
that for the period ending in 1998, because after
short-term rates achieved the zero bound, long-term
rates became much more variable than short-term
rates.
The variance ratios for the first-difference data
also give no indication of a significant thin-market













































Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Japanese Treasury Rates
R3 R6 R18 R30 R42 R54 R66 R78 R90 R102 R114
March 1981–January 2003
DF –1.13 –1.00 –1.51 –1.14 –1.09 –0.96 –0.88 –1.32 –1.28 –0.97 –0.86
(3) (0) (2) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0)
March 1981–October 1990
DF –1.28 –1.23 –1.33 –1.38 –1.31 –1.22 –1.11 –1.30 –1.56 –1.44 –1.50
(4) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)




effect. While the variance ratio first rises and then
declines during the November 1990–June 1998
period, the sharp decline in the variance occurs
before the maturity approaches 10 years. This simple
analysis suggests that the thinness of the market
may not be important for this research. If it is, it
would appear to be important only for the level of
rates and for the period March 1981–October 1990.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF 
NONSTATIONARITY FOR THE EH
A. Nonstationarity
Given the evidence of nonstationarity in
Japanese interest rates, it is important to ask, What,
if anything, does nonstationarity imply for the EH?
To answer this question, assume that the stochastic
process driving the short-term rate is
(1) ,
where rt
m is the current value of the short-term,





t =+ − ρε 1
and εt is an i.i.d. random variable distributed with a
mean zero and a variance σ
2. If 0 # ρ , 1, the short-
term interest is generated by a stationary stochastic
process. If ρ=1, on the other hand, the stochastic
process is said to be I(1). In this case, stationarity is
achieved by first-differencing the short-term rate.
The EH assumes that
(2) ,
where rt
n is the long-term, n-period rate, and k=n/m








m rather than r
m
t–1, because in the EH litera-
ture it is assumed that the short-term rate is observed
when the long-term rate is determined. Substituting
into the above expression and simplifying yields
(3) .
Therefore, if the short-term rate is I(1) and the EH
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short-term rate plus a constant risk premium. This
result stems from the fact that, if the short-term rate
is I(1), the best estimate of the short-term rate at any
horizon is its current level—changes in the short-term
rate are unpredictable, i.e., ∆r
m
t+i=εt+i for all i $1.4
The EH is useful to market participants and
policymakers because, if it holds, the spread between
the long-term rate and the short-term rate provides
information about the future level of the short-term
rate. If the short-term rate is impossible to predict,
however, the spread between long-term and short-
term rates cannot provide useful information about
the market’s expectation for the short-term rate. In
this case, the EH is of little practical use, even though
(as in the example above) it holds.
B. Cointegration
The above analysis ignores the possibility that
the short-term and long-term rates are cointegrated.
If these rates are unit root processes, but cointegrated,
they are stationary in levels in the direction of the
cointegrating vector. The idea of cointegration is
illustrated by assuming that the long-term and short-
term interest rates are jointly endogenous and that
the true data-generating process can be approxi-




n) and Θ(L) is a P-order polynomial
in the lag operator L. Equation 4 can be written as
(5) ,
where Π=(I – Θ(1)). If yt is stationary, the rank of Π
is 2. In this case, any linear combination of the long-
and short-term rates is stationary. If the short- and
long-term rates have a unit root, however, the rank
∆∆ Π y Ly y tt t t =− + −− Ψ() 11 η
yL y tt t =+ − Θ() 1 η
Ratio of the Variance of the First Difference of Each Rate to the Variance 















4 If the short-term rate is not generated by a simple I(1) process (as in
this example) but is nonstationary, the general idea still applies because
the variance of the short-term rate is not finite. It would be the case,
however, that there would be some predictability of changes in the
short-term rate. Generally speaking, the degree of predictability will
be positively related to the extent to which the root is greater than 1.
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of Π is at most 1. If the rank of Π is 1, the long- and
short-term rates are cointegrated. In this case,
αβ′=Π, where α and β are 2 × 1 vectors. The cointe-
grating vector, β, represents the long-run equilibrium
relationship between the long- and short-term
interest rates, i.e., the direction in which the relation-
ship between the levels of the rates is stationary.
Specifically, β′yt is stationary (mean reverting).
Hence, cointegration indicates that there is a stable
equilibrium relationship between the levels of the
short- and long-term interest rates, but only in the
direction of the cointegrating vector. When the vari-
ables are cointegrated, αβ′yt–1 replaces Πyt–1 in (5)
and the resulting equation is referred to as an error-
correction model (ECM), where the coefficients in
α measure the speed with which the rates adjust to
their long-run equilibrium.
C. Cointegration and the EH
If the rates are nonstationary but cointegrated,
one can test the EH by testing the hypothesis that the
cointegrating vector (adjusted for the constant risk
premium and/or a deterministic trend) equals (1, –1).
This test has been used by a number of researchers
(e.g., Stock and Watson, 1988; Hall, Anderson, and
Granger, 1992; Engsted and Tanggaard, 1994; and
Sarno and Thornton, 2003).
Lack of cointegration is relatively strong evidence
against the EH for two reasons. First, if the interest
rates are truly I(1), rejecting the hypothesis of cointe-
gration implies that there is no stable long-run rela-
tionship between the levels of the interest rates,
that is, the EH cannot hold.
Second, it is well known that the power to reject
the null hypothesis of nonstationarity is low when
the root is close to 1. Thus, it could be that interest
rates are really I(0). If this is the case, however, it
should not be too difficult to find evidence of cointe-
gration, i.e., reject the null hypothesis that there is
no stationary relationship between the long-term
rate and the short-term rate. Therefore, failure to
find evidence of at least one cointegrating relation-
ship among stationary variables is relatively strong
evidence against the EH.
Finding cointegration, but rejecting the hypoth-
esis that the cointegrating vector is (1, –1), is also
relatively strong evidence against the EH because it
suggests that the equilibrium relationship is in a
direction that is inconsistent with the EH. If the EH
does not hold in the long-run equilibrium, there is
little reason to expect that it will hold at frequencies
that are of interest to policymakers and financial
analysts.
On the other hand, finding that the EH holds in
the long run does not necessarily imply that the EH
is useful for policymakers and market analysts. To
be useful, longer-term rates must respond reason-
ably quickly to changes in the policy rate. Hence,
failing to reject the hypothesis that the cointegrating
vector is (1, –1) does not establish that the EH holds
at frequencies that are of interest to policymakers
and financial market analysts. Policymakers and
financial analysts need to know how quickly the
long-term rate can be expected to adjust to policy-
induced changes in the short-term rate.
V. TESTING THE EH FOR JAPANESE
TREASURY RATES
If the EH holds, on average, the long-term rate
will equal the short-term rate plus a constant risk
premium. A simple way to test the EH is to test for
a unit root in the spread between the long-term and
short-term rates.5 Figure 5 presents spreads between
6-month and 114-month Treasury rates and the
gensaki rate. Other spreads tend to lie within the
boundaries established by these spreads. Both
spreads exhibit considerable persistence, suggesting
the possibility that the null hypothesis of nonstation-
arity will not be rejected.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of all of the
spreads, for the entire sample period and for the
March 1981–October 1990 period, are presented
in Table 2. As before, the lag lengths were chosen by
the Schwarz criterion and are denoted in parentheses
below the Dickey-Fuller test statistic. The unit root
hypothesis is rejected for all rate spreads except
the 114-month rate for the entire sample period
and for some of the intermediate maturities for the
period ending October 1990.
The temporal stability of this conclusion is
investigated by a rolling simple Dickey-Fuller test
for the rate spreads using a sample of 78 monthly
observations. The results for R114, R54, and R6 are
presented in Figure 6. R54 is shown because the test
statistics for rates with maturities longer than 42
months were generally larger than those for the
42-month rate. The results suggest that the null
hypothesis of a unit root is somewhat borderline
for the spread between the 42-month Treasury rate
5 See Dickey, Jansen, and Thornton (1991, pp. 59-60) for a discussion
of why this is appropriate.
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests of Japanese Treasury Rate Spreads
Long rate R6 R18 R30 R42 R54 R66 R78 R90 R102 R114
March 1981–January 2003
DF –5.50* –4.94* –4.47* –4.07* –3.48* –3.15* –3.15* –3.40* –2.95* –2.79
(1) (1) (1) (0) (0) (0) (1) (1) (0) (0)
March 1981–October 1990
DF –3.66* –3.46* –3.35* –3.25* –2.84 –2.47 –2.65 –3.51* –3.42* –3.17*
(1) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (1) (0) (0)




and the gensaki rate, but is infrequently rejected for
Treasury rates with maturities longer than 42 months
and frequently rejected for rates with maturities of
less than 42 months. Furthermore, it appears that
the null hypothesis is nearly always rejected when
the long-term rate is 6 months. These results suggest
that the EH may not hold when the long-term rate
is 42 months or longer.
This conclusion is supported by formal tests for
cointegration for three periods—the entire sample
period, the period ending October 1990, and the
period from November 1990–June 1998, before
short-term rates reached the zero bound.6 The lag
order and the precise form of the cointegration
model are jointly determined by the Schwarz crite-
rion. These results suggest that the 6-, 18-, 30-, and
42-month rates are cointegrated with the 3-month
gensaki rate. The cointegration test results for rates
with maturities of longer than 42 months indicate
that these rates are not cointegrated with the gensaki
rate for either the entire sample period or for the
November 1990–June 1998 period. The results for
the March 1981–October 1990 period are mixed.
There are model specifications for which the null
hypothesis of no cointegrating vector is rejected.
These are not the specifications that minimized the
Schwarz criterion, however. Moreover, when these
models are estimated, the restriction that the cointe-
grating vector is (1, –1) is easily rejected. For these
reasons, the cointegration test results for maturities
longer than 42 months are not presented.
Estimates of the cointegrating vectors for rates
up to 42 months are presented in Table 3. The
coefficient estimates are normalized on the short-
term rate, so Table 3 reports the estimate of the
coefficient on the long-term rate and the χ
2 test
statistics for the null hypothesis that the cointegrat-
ing vector is (1, –1). The estimated coefficients are
close to –1 for the entire sample period and for the
















































6 Several alternative specifications of the cointegration model (allowing
for a constant term and/or a deterministic trend in the cointegration
relationship and no trend, a linear trend, or a quadratic trend in the
structural dynamics) and alternative lag lengths from one through
three were considered. The null hypothesis of at least one cointegrat-
ing vector is rejected in every case for the entire sample period and
for the March 1981–October 1990 subperiod.
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period March 1981–October 1990. The coefficient
is more precisely estimated for the 6- and 18-month
rates, so the null hypothesis that the cointegrating
vector is (1, –1) is rejected for the 6-month rate for
the entire sample period and for both the 6- and
18-month rates for the period March 1981–October
1990. In these cases, however, the departure of the
equilibrium relationship from that which is consis-
tent with the EH is not large. At the shorter end of
the maturity spectrum over the entire sample period
and for the March 1981–October 1990 period, the
equilibrium relationships appear to be more or less
consistent with the EH holding in the long run.
The EH is easily rejected for the November
1990–June 1998 period, however. The point esti-
mates of the coefficients on the long-term rate are
very far from –1. Moreover, the null hypothesis that
the cointegrating vector is (1, –1) is rejected for all
rates at very low significance levels. Hence, as with
previous empirical work, there is no evidence that
long-term rates behave in a manner consistent with
the EH during the more recent sample period.
VI. VAR TEST OF THE EH
Campbell and Shiller (1987) suggest that the EH
be tested by testing the restrictions imposed by the
EH on a VAR of the short-term and long-term interest
rates. The restrictions implied by the EH are highly
nonlinear, however, and the Wald test, which they
used, is known to be affected greatly by nonlinearity.
Consequently, they suggested that the major advan-
tage of their VAR approach came from its ability to
generate economic measures of the relative impor-
tance of the EH.
Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) propose a method
for testing the restrictions imposed on a VAR by the
EH using a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. Since this
procedure is relatively new, it is outlined here in some
detail. The test is illustrated using a VAR expressed
in levels; however, only minor changes are required
to use the Bekaert-Hodrick procedure to test
Campbell and Shiller’s (1987) specification.
A. Bekaert and Hodrick Test
This test is general and can be applied to any
VAR specification where the restrictions implied by
the EH can be imposed. To illustrate the procedure,
it is assumed that interest rates are stationary, so




n)′. Generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimation imposes orthogonality conditions
(( ) ) IL y tt −= Θη
Estimated Cointegrating Vectors
R6 R18 R30 R42
March 1981–January 2003
Coefficient –0.962 –1.021 –0.973 –0.961
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
χ
2 8.155 0.715 0.500 0.370
[0.004] [0.399] [0.479] [0.543]
March 1981–October 1990
Coefficient –0.96 –0.957 –0.960 –0.952
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
χ
2 6.077 4.079 2.426 2.747
[0.014] [0.043] [0.119] [0.097]
November 1990–June 1998
Coefficient –1.171 –1.308 –1.488 –1.784
(0.04) (0.07) (0.12) (0.19)
χ
2 14.476 16.751 14.082 14.903
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]




of the form g(zt,θ);ηt⊗xt–1, where xt–1 is a vector
formed from stacking lagged values of yt, possibly
with a constant, zt is defined as (yt,xt–1)′, and θ is a
vector formed from the parameters in Θ(L). Using
the sample moment condition,
(7) ,
GMM estimation proceeds by choosing θ to minimize
the following objective:
(8)
The optimal weighting matrix, W, is a consistent
estimator of the inverse of
(9)
GMM is used to estimate restricted VARs by
forming a Lagrangian from the usual GMM quadratic
objective and a vector of parameter constraints.
The Lagrangian is defined
(10) ,
where γ is a vector of Lagrange multipliers and the
constraints on θhave been represented by the vector-
valued function, aT(θ)=0. Here the matrix ΩT is
again a consistent estimate of the matrix Ω defined
above. Denoting the Jacobian of gT(θ) and aT(θ) by
GT and AT, respectively, the first-order conditions
for maximizing θ
–
and γ – can be written as
(11) .
The asymptotic distribution of the constrained
estimator can be derived from these first-order
conditions by expanding gT(θ) and aT(θ) in Taylor
series around the true parameter value, θ0, and
substituting these into the first-order conditions




–1GT. Use of the partitioned inverse
formula allows one to argue that the constrained
estimator, θ
–
, is distributed as 
for
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and the Lagrange multipliers are distributed
asymptotically as
(14)
If the constraints have a significant impact on
parameter estimation, then the estimated Lagrange
multipliers should be significantly different from
zero. The asymptotic distributions given above can
be used to show that a test that the multipliers are
jointly zero can be based on the statistic
(15) ,
which is asymptotically distributed as χ
2(l), where
l is the number of restrictions imposed.
Maximization of the Lagrangian above is often
computationally troublesome, so Taylor series
approximations to aT(θ) and gT(θ) can again be
used to derive a constrained estimate with similar
asymptotic properties. Instead of expanding
around the true value, θ0, the current estimate of




we can substitute in the first-order conditions for




The unconstrained VAR parameter estimates
are used for the initial conditions and the proce-
dure iterates until the constraints are satisfied. The
moment conditions for VAR estimation should be
uncorrelated over time. Hence, ΩT is estimated by
(17)
evaluating the moment conditions at the uncon-
strained VAR parameter estimates.
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The constraints that the EH imposes on a VAR
can be seen by writing the VAR in first-order form,
that is,





kxt for e1=(1,0,…,0)′. Note, too,
that rt
n=e2′xt for e2=(0,1,0,…,0)′. Consequently, for
any two interest rates such that k=n/m is an integer,
the EH implies that 
(19) ,
so that the EH can be expressed equivalently as
(20)
The constraints that satisfy the EH are given by
(21)
No simple closed form exists for the Jacobian of
these constraints. Consequently, they are calculated
numerically for use in the iterative procedure
described above.
B. Campbell and Shiller Test and
Cointegration
Campbell and Shiller’s (1987) specific proposal
stems from a concern that interest rates are non-
stationary. Their test is based on the fact that (2)





m denotes the m-horizon
change, i.e., ∆
mwt=wt+m – wt. Specifically, Campbell
and Shiller propose estimating a VAR representation,
(23) ,
where xt=(∆rt
m,St)′ and A(L) is a P-order polynomial
in the lag operator L, and testing the restrictions
xA L x tt t =+ − () 1 ω
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implied by equation 22. Noting that (23) can be
rewritten as
or more compactly as
(25) ,
Campell and Shiller (1987, 1991) note that (22) can
be written as
(26) .
Hence, the EH can be tested under the assumption




It should be noted that (4) and (23) are compa-
rable (ωt=ηt) if and only if the cointegrating vector is
(1, –1). In this case, Campbell and Shiller’s test pre-
serves the level relationship between the long-term
and short-term rates because, under these conditions,
(23) can be derived from simple algebraic manipula-
tions of (4).7 Thus, in situations where the long-term
and short-term rates satisfy the necessary conditions
for the EH holding in the long run, Campbell and
Shiller’s specification provides a way of testing
whether the EH holds at frequencies that are of
interest to policymakers.8
C. Results of VAR Tests
The Bekaert-Hodrick procedure is applied to
the VAR of the form of (4) under the assumption
that interest rates are stationary. Because the LM
test using the level specification is valid only if the
VAR is stable, the maximum eigenvalue for each of
the unrestricted VARs is calculated. In all instances,
the maximum eigenvalue is less than 1. The VAR test
is also applied to the Campbell-Shiller VAR, (23),
under the assumption that interest rates are non-
′ − ′ −− −− =
−− e e A I m n IAIA IA
nm
21
11 0 [ ( )( )( ) ]( ) /
Se A I m n IAIA IAx t
nm
t = ′ −− −−
−−
1
11 [ ( )( )( ) ]( ) /
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7 See Thornton (1985, especially the appendix) and Chow (1964) for a
discussion of the role of normalization in regression analyses.
8 This test has been employed using a Wald test by Campbell and Shiller
(1987) and Carriero, Favero, and Kaminska (2003) and using the LM
test by Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) and Dittmar and Thornton (2003).
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stationary. In all cases, following Bekaert and Hodrick
(2001), the order of the VAR is determined by the
Schwarz criterion.
Table 4 reports the LM statistic and the corre-
sponding significance level for the tests on the VAR
in levels. The lag length, chosen by the Schwarz
criterion, is reported next to the significance level.
Instances where the null hypothesis is rejected at
the 5 percent level are in bold type. The results are
reported using the 3-month gensaki rate and the 6-
month Treasury rate as the short-term rate. For the
entire sample period, the restrictions implied by the
EH are frequently rejected at the 5 percent signifi-
cance level and in every case at a slightly higher
significance level. This finding may reflect evidence
that Japanese rates are nonstationary, particularly
for rates at the longer end of the maturity spectrum,
since it appears that such rates are not cointegrated
with the gensaki rate.
The EH does not fare well either for the period
ending on October 1990 or for the period November
1990–June 1998, where the EH is frequently rejected
at the 5 percent significance level and nearly always
at the 10 percent level. Instances where the EH is
not rejected at the 5 percent level when the evidence
indicates that the rates are not cointegrated suggests
the possibility that the test has low power when
rates are not cointegrated.
The LM test is also applied to the VAR suggested
by Campbell and Shiller (1987). Recall that this test
is valid only if the rates are cointegrated with a
cointegrating vector of (1, –1). Since interest rates
are only cointegrated at the short end of the maturity
spectrum and since the null hypothesis that the
cointegrating vector is (1, –1) is frequently rejected,
this test may be valid only for short maturities and
only then for the first two sample periods.
The results for this test for the three sample
periods are presented in Table 5. The results for the
entire sample period are consistent with the results
reported in Table 4. With one exception (the 42-
month rate), the EH is rejected for the gensaki rate
LM Statistics for LM Test Using Level Data
March 1981–January 2003 March 1981–October 1990 November 1990–June 1998
R3 R6 R3 R6 R3 R6
R6 139.228 — 119.619 — 68.705 —
(0.000) 2 (0.000) 1 (0.000) 1
R18 14.315 5.903 9.562 5.467 8.257 10.548
(0.006) 2 (0.052) 1 (0.008) 1 (0.065) 1 (0.016) 1 (0.005) 1
R30 11.409 13.613 6.402 14.601 8.190 11.539
(0.022) 2 (0.001) 1 (0.041) 1 (0.001) 1 (0.017) 1 (0.003) 1
R42 9.155 10.710 4.966 7.692 8.519 10.442
(0.057) 2 (0.005) 1 (0.083) 1 (0.021) 1 (0.014) 1 (0.005) 1
R54 24.812 13.943 5.957 8.111 9.595 11.562
(0.000) 3 (0.001) 1 (0.051) 1 (0.017) 1 (0.008) 1 (0.003) 1
R66 27.534 15.901 8.949 7.875 12.708 11.810
(0.000) 3 (0.000) 1 (0.062) 2 (0.019) 1 (0.002) 1 (0.003) 1
R78 17.302 13.373 11.335 6.483 12.132 12.039
(0.002) 2 (0.001) 1 (0.023) 2 (0.039) 1 (0.002) 1 (0.002) 1
R90 24.562 8.364 10.547 4.463 10.764 10.879
(0.000) 3 (0.015) 1 (0.032) 2 (0.107) 1 (0.005) 1 (0.004) 1
R102 16.847 7.311 3.439 4.690 8.875 9.307
(0.010) 3 (0.026) 1 (0.179) 1 (0.096) 1 (0.012) 1 (0.010) 1
R114 13.828 9.031 4.140 6.788 8.086 8.523
(0.032) 3 (0.011) 1 (0.126) 1 (0.034) 1 (0.018) 1 (0.014) 1
NOTE: Parentheses indicate significance levels; bold type indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance level.
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at a very low significance level for long-term rates
shorter than 102 months. The failure of the test to
reject the EH when the long-term rate is 42 months
and longer than 90 months is surprising and may
be indicative of low power when rates are not coin-
tegrated or the cointegrating vector is not (1, –1).
This interpretation is supported by the results
for the March 1981–October 1990 and November
1990–June 1998 periods. When the gensaki rate is
the short-term rate, the EH is rejected when the long-
term rate is the 6-month rate. This is particularly
true for the November 1990–June 1998 period,
where the null hypothesis that the cointegrating
vector is (1, –1) is always rejected regardless of the
maturity of the long-term rate and the restrictions
implied by the EH are never rejected. In any event,
that the test tends to fail to reject the EH when rates
appear not to be cointegrated or when the cointe-
grating vector appears to be different from (1, –1)
suggests that this test may lack power when applied
to data that do not satisfy the assumptions under
which they are derived.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE REJECTION
OF THE EH FOR MONETARY POLICY
Finding that the EH does not hold presents a
problem for the conventional view of the monetary
policy transmission processes. According to this
view, the central bank controls a very short-term
interest rate and the effects of monetary policy are
transmitted to longer-term rates in accordance with
the EH. Since it is widely believed that investment
spending depends on the behavior of relatively long-
term interest rates, the fact that the EH appears not
to hold for longer-term rates is problematic for the
conventional view of monetary policy.
It is important to note, however, that the extent
of this problem depends on exactly why the EH does
not hold. One explanation for the failure of the EH—
the overreaction hypothesis (ORH)—does not neces-
sarily reduce the effectiveness of policy. Indeed, the
efficacy of policy could be enhanced. According to
the ORH, long-term rates overreact to expected
LM Statistics for Campbell-Shiller Test
March 1981–January 2003 March 1981–October 1990 November 1990–June 1998
R3 R6 R3 R6 R3 R6
R6 19.620 — 7.396 — 8.259 —
(0.001) 2 (0.024) 1 (0.016) 1
R18 23.597 6.762 4.671 4.565 0.300 2.540
(0.001) 3 (0.034) 1 (0.097) 1 (0.102) 1 (0.861) 1 (0.281) 1
R30 12.193 9.660 4.013 13.551 0.712 1.783
(0.016) 2 (0.008) 1 (0.134) 1 (0.001) 1 (0.701) 1 (0.410) 1
R42 8.411 6.851 3.144 6.834 0.670 0.943
(0.078) 2 (0.033) 1 (0.208) 1 (0.033) 1 (0.715) 1 (0.624) 1
R54 14.545 7.636 11.324 6.086 0.644 1.807
(0.006) 2 (0.022) 1 (0.023) 2 (0.048) 1 (0.725) 1 (0.405) 1
R66 22.301 8.196 9.947 6.496 1.244 1.583
(0.001) 3 (0.017) 1 (0.041) 2 (0.039) 1 (0.537) 1 (0.453) 1
R78 23.964 7.481 12.912 6.107 0.693 1.430
(0.001) 3 (0.024) 1 (0.012) 2 (0.047) 1 (0.707) 1 (0.489) 1
R90 14.680 4.272 3.188 3.536 0.316 0.663
(0.005) 2 (0.118) 1 (0.203) 1 (0.171) 1 (0.854) 1 (0.718) 1
R102 8.162 2.635 2.234 2.496 0.286 0.185
(0.086) 2 (0.268) 1 (0.327) 1 (0.287) 1 (0.867) 1 (0.911) 1
R114 7.627 5.165 2.941 4.664 0.437 0.693
(0.106) 2 (0.076) 1 (0.230) 1 (0.097) 1 (0.804) 1 (0.707) 1
NOTE: Parentheses indicate significance levels; bold type indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance level.
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changes in the short-term rate. Hence, during periods
when the market expects interest rates to rise, long-
term rates rise too much and too fast. Over time, and
as expectations adjust, long-term rates fall while
the short-term rate rises, which accounts for the
failure of the EH. The ORH is not supported by evi-
dence in the United States. Poole, Rasche, and
Thornton (2002) show that the coefficient on a sur-
prise change in the Federal Reserve Board’s federal
funds rate target for long-term rates is much smaller
than that for short-term rates. Moreover, for rates
longer than 12 months the estimated response is
not statistically significant. Bekaert, Hodrick, and
Marshall (2001) investigate a rational version of the
ORH—namely, a “peso problem,” where high interest
rate regimes occur less frequently than rationally
anticipated. They find that the peso problem cannot
account for the failure of the EH in the United States.
Moreover, the ORH implies that long-term rates
move more than short-term rates over the rate cycle.
Thus, if the ORH is true, the variance of long-term
rates should be generally larger than the variance
of short-term rates. Figure 3 shows that this expla-
nation is unlikely to account for the failure of the
EH over the period January 1980–October 1990. The
existence of the zero bound in the 1990s renders
this explanation suspect since then.
Other explanations, such as the failure of
rational expectations or, more generally, the market’s
inability to predict the behavior of interest rates, are
more difficult for the conventional view of policy.9
Either explanation implies that long-term rates need
not be determined solely or in large part by the
market’s expectation for the policy rate. In such a
circumstance, it is hard to understand how policy
actions that affect very short-term rates are pre-
dictably transmitted along the yield curve. Some
recent work using U.S. interest rates (Diebold and Li,
2003; Duffee, 2002; Carriero, Favero, and Kaminska,
2003; and Rudebusch, 2002) suggests that much of
the failure of the EH in the United States might be
due to the market participants’ inability to forecast
short-term rates.
One of the most frequently cited reasons for
the failure of the EH is that the risk premium is time
varying, rather than constant as the EH requires.
One problem with this explanation is that any failure
of the EH implies that the deviations in the risk
premium are not i.i.d., i.e., they are not time invari-
ant. Hence, stating that the risk premium is time
varying can be viewed as merely an alternative way
of stating that the EH does not hold. For monetary
policy to be effective, the actions of the monetary
authority must be predictably transmitted to longer-
term rates. For policy actions (which affect short-
term rates) to have their desired effect on long-term
rates, policymakers must be able to predict how the
risk premium will vary over time—the efficacy of
policy depends on policymakers’ ability to predict
changes in the risk premium.
While it is important to know that the EH does
not hold, it is equally important to understand why
it does not hold. It is now well established that,
generally speaking, the EH does not hold in Japan.
Research should now be focused on investigating
why.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The deregulation of the Japanese bond market
has generated interest in testing the expectations
hypothesis (EH) of the term structure using Japanese
data. This paper extends that literature by testing the
EH for Japanese Treasury rates ranging in maturity
from 6 to 114 months. This paper differs from pre-
vious tests of the EH using Japanese data in that it
(i) considers the effects of nonstationarity on the EH,
(ii) explicitly accounts for the stationarity of the data
in testing the EH, and (iii) tests the EH by testing
the restrictions imposed by it on two different VAR
specifications of the short-term and long-term rates:
one that assumes that interest rates are stationary
and another that assumes that interest rates are
nonstationary.
The results under the assumption that interest
rates are stationary are not supportive of the EH. The
EH is nearly always rejected at the 5 percent signifi-
cance level, and in all but two instances rejected at
the 10 percent significance level over the entire
sample period and the subperiods considered.
The results are somewhat more supportive of
the EH if one assumes that interest rates are non-
stationary. A necessary condition for the EH holding
is that the short-term and long-term rates are cointe-
grated. The evidence indicates that the gensaki rate
is cointegrated with Treasury rates, but only for rates
with maturities of 42 months or shorter. Conse-
quently, the evidence suggests that the EH is likely
to hold only at the short end of the maturity spec-
trum. Even in some of these instances, however, the
hypothesis that the spread between the long-term
and short-term rates is the equilibrium cointegrat-
9 For example, Balduzzi, Bertola, and Foresi (1997) attempt to reconcile
some of the empirical results by arguing that they are due in part to
the market’s failure to predict policy-induced short-term rate changes.
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ing vector is rejected. In these instances, the EH is
rejected.
The Campbell and Shiller (1987) test is applied
to all combinations of short- and long-term rates,
despite the fact that most rates do not satisfy the
necessary conditions for the test to be applied. The
EH is nearly always rejected at the 5 percent signifi-
cance level over the entire sample period. This is
not the case for the two shorter samples, however.
Indeed, for about half of the combinations of short-
term and long-term rates for the two shorter samples,
the EH is not rejected, even at the 10 percent level.
There are several issues that make this favorable
interpretation for the EH problematic. First, and
perhaps most troubling, the EH is rejected at a very
low significance level when the short-term and long-
term rates are the 3-month gensaki and 6-month
Treasury rates, respectively. This is true for all three
sample periods. Hence, the EH appears not to hold
at the short end of the maturity spectrum, where
most analysts (e.g., Rudebusch, 2002) believe that
it is more likely to hold.
Second, the EH is frequently not rejected in
cases where the evidence suggests (i) that interest
rates are either not cointegrated or (ii) the spread
between the long-term and short-term rates is not
the cointegrating vector. Because the Campbell and
Shiller (1987) test does not preserve the relationship
between the levels of the rates if these conditions
are not met, it is unclear whether the failure to reject
the EH is because the EH holds or because the test
has low power in such circumstances.
Third, relatively favorable results are obtained
only when the gensaki rate is the short-term rate.
When the 6-month rate is the short-term rate, the
EH is frequently rejected at the shorter end of the
term structure. Both this result and the rejection of
the EH when the long-term rate is the 6-month rate
could be due to idiosyncrasies in the behavior of
the 6-month rate.
All in all, the EH appears not to fare well in Japan.
If interest rates are nonstationary, the EH holds, at
best, only at the short end of the maturity spectrum.
This is encouraging, because most economists
believe that the EH is likely to be the most relevant
at the short end of the yield curve. This interpretation
of the evidence presented here is consistent with
recent analysis by Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002) and
Takeda and Yajima (2002), who find evidence that is
broadly consistent with the EH using high-frequency,
daily data over the period of the Bank of Japan’s zero
interest rate policy. Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002) find
that the yield curve flattens out over horizons of 3
months following the Bank of Japan’s adoption of a
zero interest rate policy and widens following the
termination of the zero interest rate policy.10
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